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Abstract
Several papers have documented that when subjects play with standard laboratory
endowments they make less self-interested choices then when they use money they
have either earned through a laboratory task or brought from outside the lab. In
the context of a charitable giving experiment we decompose common "house money"
eﬀects into two components: the tangibility of cash in hand relative to money (or ecu's)
promised on a computer screen, and the desert of earned money relative to random
windfall gains. While both components are found to be signiﬁcant in non-parametric
tests, the former eﬀect, which has been neglected in previous studies, has a stronger
eﬀect on total donations. These results have clear implications for experimental design,
and also suggest that the availability of less tangible payment methods may increase
charitable donations.1
1 Introduction
Several economists have found that when subjects play with standard laboratory endow-
ments they make less self-interested choices then when they use money they have either
earned through a laboratory task or brought from outside the lab (Cherry et al., 2002,
Hoﬀman and Spitzer, 1985, Loomes and Burrows, 1994). This eﬀect is typically interpreted
as a result of Lockean desert eﬀects (Rutstrom and Williams, 2000), fairness concerns (a
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la Rabin (1993)), or a diﬀerent mental accounting over windfall gains (Sheﬀrin and Thaler,
1988, Thaler, 1985 and Thaler and Johnson, 1990); this is generally referred to as the windfall
eﬀect.
In the context of dictator games, the evidence for windfall eﬀects is strong. Cherry et al.
(2002) ran a series experiments in which dictators were provisionally allocated either $10
or $40 in cash in an envelope and asked to propose a division of it between themselves
and another subject by leaving the amount they want the other subject to receive in the
same envelope. In the baseline treatment the allocation was randomly determined, while
in their earnings treatment the dictators had to arrive one hour earlier than the recipient
subjects, and their endowment was based on performance in a cognitive task (solving GMAT
questions), and this was common knowledge. Finally, their double blind with earnings treat-
ment modiﬁed the earnings treatment to increase subject-experimenter anonymity.2 Both
their earnings and double-blind-earnings lead to signiﬁcantly less generous dictator behav-
ior; the latter treatment the dictators became almost entirely hardnosed, keeping nearly all
of the money. Their results strongly suggest that both earnings (legitimized assets) and
reputation-seeking concerns vis-a-vis the experimenter (which they term strategic) signiﬁ-
cantly aﬀect dictators' behavior.
Mittone and Ploner (2006) start with a replication of Cherry et al.'s double-blind-earnings
treatment as their control group, and compare this with dictator behavior when potential
recipients are allowed to take the quiz, but are not compensated for this. They ﬁnd that
dictators give signiﬁcantly more, and are more likely to give something, when recipients have
also taken the quiz, and this holds for all levels of earnings (success in GMAT questions).
This suggests that fairness concerns are important, and that relative desert may be driving
dictator decisions. Rue (1998) Oxoby and Spraggon (2008), and Cherry and Shogren
(2008) ﬁnd similar results on the importance of the receiver's eﬀort.
In all of the experiments mentioned above the dictator subjects' earnings come from
answering GMAT questions, some of which involve retailers' and consumers' decisions, dis-
honest job applicants, wealth, investments, money, and marketing. These may be triggering
more self-interested behavior through a framing eﬀect as in Vohs et al. (2006), rather than
simply increased legitimacy of the dictators' own endowments. However, the estimated rela-
tionships between the dictators' gifts and the recipient's performance, hence the impact of
fairness (relative desert) are robust to this critique.
2In the former treatments each dictator passes her envelope to the experimenter after making her choice.
In the latter treatment, the dictators drop their envelopes into a box. Furthermore, in the latter treatment,
the dictator has a two in 12 chance of getting an envelope ﬁlled with only blank paper and thus not having
any money to pass at all  hence the experimenter can never infer with certainty that a particular dictator
was selﬁsh, although the experimenter could still make a probabilistic judgment about subjects' behavior.
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In contrast to the dictator environment, there is little evidence for windfall eﬀects in
voluntary contribution mechanism (henceforth VCM) experiments. Clark (2002) examines
contribution rates in a linear VCM game. He ﬁnds no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between contri-
butions in the own money treatment, in which subjects are asked to bring $8 from outside
the lab to purchase tokens, and the house money treatment, in which subjects are simply
given the tokens.3 However, as Clark's own money subjects are also allocated house money
at the end of the experiment, they presumably have the same expected windfall earnings
as the other subjects. Furthermore, Clark's subjects use tokens, and the earnings eﬀect may
be more salient when the rewards are more tangible.
Cherry et al. (2005) ﬁnd that while heterogeneity in earnings decreased contributions,
the origin of these earnings  whether derived randomly or through success in answering
GMAT questions  did not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect. Kroll et al. (2007) and Spraggon and
Oxoby (2009) allow subjects to choose a strategy vector method (see Fischbacher et al.
(2001) and Keser and van Winden (2000)), and identify a surprising inverse found money
eﬀect: participants who earned their endowments and were matched with someone who
did not were more unconditionally and conditionally cooperative.
Finally, there is some very recent evidence in the context of charitable giving itself.
Carlsson et al. ﬁnd windfall eﬀects in a charitable giving experiment in both a laboratory
and a ﬁeld setting; subjects in both environments donate less when they have earned their
pay by completing a survey. Soetevent (2009) compared treatments with diﬀerent payment
options (debit cards, cash, or both) in a door-to-door solicitation campaign, ﬁnding that
smaller donors drop out when cash is disallowed, while participation increases when only
cash (and not debit cards) is allowed. However, he does not decompose the eﬀects of the
greater anonymity of the cash payment, the small coin nuisance, the lack of trust in debit
card security, and the impact of the use of cash itself.
This literature (aside from Soetevent, 2009) has ignored a second component of the house
money bias that limits the external validity of many laboratory results: people may treat
money they are promised (or are given in the form of tokens) diﬀerently then cash they
physically hold  we call this the tangibility eﬀect.4 We hypothesize three potential reasons
why this may occur. First, psychology experiments (involving deception) demonstrate that
subjects given reminders of money are both less helpful and less likely to ask for help in a
variety of non-remunerated tasks (Vohs et al., 2006). Second, using cash may cause subjects
3Still, Harrison (2007), who reanalyzed Clark's data to deal with the potentially non-independent error
structure, suggests that a house money eﬀect is present. Still, the tangibility and earnings eﬀects are not
separable in this context
4The use of such payments is ubiquitous in experimental economics.
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to more carefully consider the consumption they are sacriﬁcing.5 Finally, parting with cash
may itself bring some disutility, perhaps through an attachment to this money similar to
the endowment eﬀect of Kahneman et al. (1991).6In the present paper we present the ﬁrst
salient, non-deceptive experimental evidence that the tangibility of the choice medium aﬀects
other-regarding decisions.
2 Experimental design7
We use a charitable giving experiment with a 2×2×2 design to diﬀerentiate two components
of the house money eﬀect. Firstly, the treatments vary according to the extent to which
subjects should see the money as earned ; we compare giving behavior after compensation
based on performance on a ﬁve minute task to behavior with a randomly allocated payment.
The second dimension of variation involves the tangibility of the payment: we either give
cash to the subjects before they decide how much to donate (and they physically place any
donations they make into envelopes) or they allocate their donation from an endowment
on the computer screen and they are paid cash at the end of the experiment. Thus, we
separately test whether earning the money and having cash in hand aﬀect giving behavior
in the lab.8
Unlike many of the experiments previously mentioned, our subjects make decisions over
donations to charitable foundations  institutions outside the laboratory. In line with Eckel
and Grossman (1996), we see this as a more obvious and typical expression of other-regarding
behavior than donations to a laboratory public good or towards another laboratory subject.
Our environment also provides a more demanding test for tangibility and windfall eﬀects.
In the real world it is rare to be asked for a gift from a random non-needy stranger (or
to receive such a gift); hence, it is not surprising that standard dictator games should be
sensitive to framing eﬀects. On the other hand charitable appeals and charitable giving are
regularities, so subjects will have more experience with such decisions and their decisions
should be less easily perturbed. While dictator giving to other subjects is highly sensitive to
the level of social isolation, falling to very low levels in double-blind environments Hoﬀman
5Oberholzer-Gee and Eichenberger (1999) make a similar case, arguing that subjects do not fully consider
the opportunity costs of the funds they give away in experiments. Also see Mazar et al. (2008) who ﬁnd
more cheating with exchangeable tokens then with cash.
6We leave distinguishing between these explanations for future research. Nonetheless all these hypotheses
have similar implications for experimental design and for charitable fundraising.
7Pictures of key computer screens are given in the appendix.
8This third dimension of variation is in the choice set; we oﬀer three charities instead of two in the
expanded choice set treatment. This allows us to measure the sensitivity of our observed eﬀect to variations
in the choice set, and also pertains to our simultaneous work on expenditure substitution in charitable
giving (for an earlier draft, see Reinstein (2008)).
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et al. (1996)), charitable giving persists at signiﬁcant levels even under highly anonymous
conditions (Eckel and Grossman, 1996). Our setting may also better isolate the eﬀect of
asset legitimacy: intuition suggests that in the charitable giving context, subjects will focus
less on their desert relative to the recipient(s) then they would in deciding how much to give
to a fellow subject. Finally, our setting is relevant to an important sector of the economy.9
All treatments are assigned orthogonally; we have a (nearly) fully balanced design.10 By
construction, the distribution of initial allocations is the same for each treatment. Finally,
all of our treatments involve the same strong level of anonymity.11 The time spent in each
treatment of our experiment is approximately the same, so subjects in each of our treatments
should have the same earnings expectations.
The sessions were run at the Jena University Experimental Economics lab using the
standard subject pool. In total 190 subjects participated in the experiments of which 54.2%
were female.12 The sessions were conducted in October 2008 (39 subjects), February 2009
(79 subjects), and September 2009 (72 subjects). While we ran each of the four payment
regime treatments in a separate session, the participants were from the same subject pool
and the times and dates of the experiment were stratiﬁed by treatment.13 To avoid mixing
payment types, we did not give subjects pre-experiment show-up fee.
To guarantee anonymity, the lab was divided into an outer partition - which serves as
a meeting room before the experiment and as a room for the administrators during the
experiment - and an inner partition with computer terminals on which the subjects make
decisions and answer questions. These were separated so that it was impossible to see the in-
ner partition from the from the outer partition and vice-versa. For administrative purposes,
a volunteer from the participants helped with the procedures whenever communication be-
tween the inner and the outer part of the lab was necessary. Furthermore, to ensure our
credibility, this volunteer supervised the online donations made by the experimenters after
9Benz and Meier (2006) oﬀer some support for the generalizability of lab charitable giving behavior.
10Because the treatments were run in separate sessions and their were some no-shows, the actual observa-
tions are very slightly oﬀ-balance, and the allocations are not precisely identically distributed by treatment,
nor is the choice set treatment. However, these slight diﬀerences are controlled for in our multivariate re-
gressions and in our balanced bootstrapped rank-sum tests. The lack of balance does not measurably aﬀect
any of our results. Our treatments are also not perfectly balanced over time. To test for session-speciﬁc
eﬀects, in the appendix we also report regressions with standard errors clustered by session, and controls
controlling for time-of-day and date of session eﬀects; our results are robust to all of these, and none of these
are signiﬁcant.
11See the protocol in the appendix for a full description of our careful procedure to insure subject-
experimenter and subject-subject anonymity.
12We did not collect extensive demographics on our subjects in order to preserve subject-experimenter
anonymity.
13Appendix D illustrates this balance, and shows our results are insensitive to the time and date of the
session.
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the other participants had been dismissed.
At the beginning of the experiment all subjects were assured that we would not be able
to connect their name to the decisions they made. Next we asked for a volunteer to help us
with administrative issues, mainly allocating the sealed envelopes with payouts at the end
of the experiment.
The task Subjects in the performance treatments (PA and PC, described below) were told
that their endowment would depend on their performance on a simple task. They were asked
to add up ﬁve two-digit numbers14 using only scratch paper and a pencil. The numbers were
randomly drawn and presented to the subjects as in the example below:
12 77 34 55 62 __
The participants were given ﬁve minutes to solve as many tasks as possible. We argue that
this task was suﬃciently tedious to make subjects feel that they earned the money recieved.
This task, although numerical, is less likely to cue self-interested economic thinking than
the GMAT questions used in many previous studies.
The charitable giving stage This stage was a one-shot dictator game where subjects
could donate none, some, or all of their endowment to any combination of the available
charities in units of 50 Euro cents. All subjects were presented with Brot für die Welt
(BfdW)  Bread for the World, a German development aid agency and the World Wild
Life Fund for Nature (WWF), a nature conservancy charity. For the expanded choice set
treatment we also included Deutsches Rotes Kreuz (DRK) - the German Red Cross - which
operates in similar areas as BfdW. Subjects were given information about each of the charities
on the computer screen15 and next had to decide how much (if anything) to donate to each
available charity and enter this into the computer.16 By using multiple charities we reduced
the noise surrounding heterogeneous tastes for charities, and gained more useful data on a
wider range of subjects.
14This task has been used in various occasions for testing competitiveness (e.g., (Niederle and Vesterlund,
2007)).
15Translations can be found in appendix B.
16The order of the presentation of the charities, both on the description screens and on the actual donation
screen are stratiﬁed over subjects, in order to control (and test) for potential order eﬀects.
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Treatment 1: Performance / (on-screen) Account (PA) Subjects in the performance
treatments were told that the probability of higher earnings increased in the number of
tasks correctly completed, but we did not specify exactly how performance translated into
payoﬀs.17 After completing the task they were told how much this earned them. In account
treatments they were allocated ¿5, ¿7.50 or ¿10 (shown on their computer screen) but
were not yet given cash. They next made their donation decisions. At the end of the
experiment they were (anonymously) given envelopes containing their earnings minus their
total donations.
Treatment 2: Performance / Cash (PC) As in PA, subjects ﬁrst completed the task
ﬁrst and learned how much they earned. However, unlike in the account treatments, subjects
in cash treatments were paid in cash before they made giving decisions. After the task stage,
the volunteer was prompted to come outside and bring the numbered envelopes containing
the cash earnings into the inner part , where they hand each subject the envelope with
his or her subject number on it. The payment envelopes were carefully assembled to look
identical and have similar weights.18 Subjects were instructed to inspect and count the
money in private at their computer desks. Next, they made their donation decision(s) by
entering these choices on the computer screen. Finally, subjects were asked to put the chosen
contributions (in cash) into the donation envelope and seal it.
Treatment 3: Random / on screen Account (RA) In this treatment, subjects were
allocated ¿5, ¿7.50 or ¿10 randomly on their computer screen. The donation stage followed,
and payments were distributed as in PC.
Treatment 4: Random / Cash (RC) In the RC treatment the allocations were ran-
domly determined (as in RA), and given to the subjects in identical envelopes as in PC. The
donation and payments procedure also followed PC.
17We do not tell them that their pay was based on relative performance because we do not want them
to compare themselves to other subjects in making their charitable contributions . This might lead them
to believe that that subjects who earned more have a greater obligation to donate. In the treatments of
October 2008, the ﬁrst got ¿10, the second ¿7.50 and the rest of the subjects in the same session ¿5. In the
sessions conducted in February, March, and September 2009, the participants who were in the upper tercile
of solved tasks received ¿10, in the middle tercile ¿7.50 and in the lower tercile ¿5.
18We did this by using coins of diﬀerent increments. To the extent that small coins are less desirable then
bills this would lead to a bias against our ﬁnding of a tangibility eﬀect. Since payments in performance and
random treatments had the same distribution, this should not impact our earnings eﬀect ﬁndings.
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Table 1: Average proportion contributed by payment regimes
Payment
Allocation Random Performance Total N
Account 0.27 0.18 0.23 99
Cash 0.14 0.12 0.13 91
Total 0.21 0.15 0.18
N 102 88 190
Wilcoxon rank sum tests
P(Account> Cash) 0.57* (0.06); [0.05]
P(Random> Performance) 0.58** (0.05); [0.03]
P(Account/Random > Cash/Performance) 0.64*** (0.01); [0.00]
P(Account/Random > Cash/Random) 0.61* (0.06); [0.05]
P(Account/Performance > Cash/Performance) 0.53 (0.59); [0.57]
P(Account/Performance > Cash/Random) 0.49 (0.86); [0.85]
p-values for simple rank sum tests in parentheses, *: p< 0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01
In square brackets: p-values for bootstrapped rank sum tests, 1000 draws, balanced by all treatments and stake sizes.
3 Results
3.1 Summary Statistics
Table 1 compares the proportion of the endowments donated to any of the two (or three)
charities, pooling across charity treatments. Subjects donated signiﬁcantly less19 when they
were paid in cash then when their allocation was only shown on the computer screen (13%
versus 23% of the total funds, pooling across all other treatments).20
Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution of the share of earnings donated over the
earnings and payment treatments. The distribution of contributions under on-screen enti-
tlements (RA and PA) stochastically dominates the distribution under cash payments (RC
and PC). Similarly, the distribution under random payments (RA and RC) stochastically
dominates the distribution under performance-based earnings (PA and PC).21
19These diﬀerences are signiﬁcant in Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, as well as in familiar parametric tests
(available by request). Because of the aforementioned lack of balance (stemming from no-shows), we also
report bootstrapped rank-sum tests in brackets, with each of the 1000 random draws (with replacement)
exactly balanced by payment treatment, earnings treatment, choice set treatment, and stake size.
20
This rate of giving is fairly consistent with results of previous experiments. E.g., in Eckel and Grossman
(1996) subjects give 30% of their $10 cash allocation (they were also given a $5 show-up fee).
21On the other hand, as shown in table 2, the performance treatment lead to a signiﬁcantly lower propensity
to donate (50% versus 64%), while the cash treatment had no noticeable extensive margin eﬀect. However,
in Probit regressions (available by request) none of our treatments are signiﬁcant.
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Table 2: Number of subjects who donated by treatment
Payment Allocation
Random Performance Account Cash
Donated N (column
%)
N (col. %) N (col. %) N (col. %)
No 37 (46%) 44 (50%) 42 (42%) 39 (43%)
Yes 65 (64%) 44 (50%) 57 (58%) 52 (57%)
Total number 102 88 99 91
p-values of tests
Pearson χ2 0.06 0.95
Fisher's exact 0.07 1.00
Figure 1: Cumulative distribution functions of share of earnings donated
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3.2 Multivariate Analysis
To control for observable (random) diﬀerences in treatment assignment and examine the
heterogeneity of our observed eﬀects in a standard framework, we regress total donations on
controls for observable heterogeneity and treatment interactions.22 These regressions again
suggest that cash treatments signiﬁcantly and consistently reduced generosity. Donations
were also higher when subjects were paid according to their performance, but thiseﬀect was
not statistically signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcients on higher stake sizes (¿7.5 or ¿10) are small
and not signiﬁcant: subjects who earn more do not tend to donate more. In line with
some previous work, (e.g., Eckel and Grossman (1998), List (2004)) women donated more
than men. Total donations were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent when a third charity was included.
The interaction eﬀects are not signiﬁcant, although their positive sign and magnitude suggest
that the treatments may not have an additive eﬀect but may be substitutes  the summed
coeﬃcient representing the eﬀect of cash and performance combined is very close to the
coeﬃcient on cash alone.
As we show in the appendix, the tangibility and windfall eﬀects on donations to each
charity are similar, and our results also hold for a fractional response Papke and Wooldridge
(1996) regression of share donated.
4 Conclusion
Our experiment is the ﬁrst to document the tangibility eﬀect; its magnitude appears at
least as strong as the windfall eﬀect (although the latter has a stronger eﬀect at the ex-
tensive margin). Furthermore, by using a charitable giving context and a relatively neutral
real-eﬀort task, we add to the evidence that the legitimacy (absolute desert) of experimen-
tal subjects' own assets aﬀect their other-regarding behavior. Our ﬁndings do not imply
that experimenters should always use tangible cash. In the context of our experiment, we
cannot say which contribution level is more externally valid. Whether the diﬀerences are
because seeing money cues self-interest, because cash causes a more careful consideration of
trade-oﬀs, or because parting with cash is more painful, either frame (cash or endowment)
may have external validity.23 In the ﬁeld many decisions are made without physical cash.
22We use both a standard OLS speciﬁcation for familiarity. We use a Poisson speciﬁcation, both because
our data resembles count data (in increments of 50 cents) and because this speciﬁcation deals with corner-
solution (non-negative) data without being as sensitive to non-normality and heteroskedasticity as a standard
Tobit regression Gourieroux et al. (1984); Arabmazar and Schmidt (1981). In the appendix we ﬁnd similar
results using a fractional regression speciﬁcation. The cash and performance results are similar in zero-
inﬂated Poisson regressions (available by request).
23On the other hand, cash is obviously better if it leads to greater experimenter credibility. But this is
unlikely to have been a driver of our results, as all of our subjects had previously participated in economic
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Table 3: Poisson and OLS regression on total donations
Add. contr. Gender contr.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Psn. OLS Psn. OLS Psn. OLS
Pay cash -0.75* -0.84* -0.75* -0.84* -0.77** -0.89**
(0.30) (0.33) (0.30) (0.34) (0.29) (0.34)
Pay by performance -0.42 -0.54 -0.42 -0.54 -0.43 -0.58
(0.31) (0.39) (0.31) (0.40) (0.30) (0.41)
Cash × performance 0.31 0.44 0.32 0.44 0.41 0.56
(0.59) (0.49) (0.59) (0.50) (0.60) (0.52)
Third charity 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.26
(0.23) (0.25) (0.22) (0.24)
Stake: 7.5 -0.14 -0.13 -0.084 -0.084
(0.27) (0.29) (0.26) (0.28)
Stake: 10 0.077 0.093 0.064 0.100
(0.29) (0.32) (0.27) (0.31)
Female 0.49* 0.53*
(0.23) (0.25)
Combined coeﬃcients
Cash+perform+cash × perform -0.76* -0.94** -0.76* -0.94** -0.73* -0.92**
( 0.32) ( 0.37) ( 0.32) ( 0.37) ( 0.31) ( 0.36)
Observations 190 190 190 190 190 190
R2 0.048 0.056 0.079
Pseudo R2 0.033 0.039 0.055
Standard errors in parentheses, reported heteroskedasticity robust for OLS.
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 for tests using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (for all columns)
All regressors are dichotomous (0,1) variables, dy/dx for discrete change of dummy variable reported .
11
However, researchers must be aware of this framing eﬀect and take it into account. This
distinction is important: economic experiments vary greatly along both dimensions, often
simultaneously. For example, in Hoﬀman et al. (1996) the "single blind 2" treatment com-
bines both a decreased social distance from the experimenter (relative to "single blind 1")
and "a decision form for making the decision, instead of money". As noted in Hoﬀman et al.
(1994), comparisons between experimental results must take into account diﬀerences in the
decision medium.24
Our results may also be generalizable to real-world decision making, particularly over
intangible warm-glow goods such as charitable donations. For example, rather than asking
for cash, charitable organizations might do better to solicit donations in less tangible forms,
such as through credit-cards or payroll deductions from future years' income.25
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A Protocol  Not for publication26
Lab Setup
There must be two parts to the laboratory. One, the Inside is where the subjects sit at
their desks/computers, and the other, the Outside is where we the experimenters, meet the
subjects at the beginning and end. The Inside must not be viewable from the Outside, and
this must be obvious. We set up subject computers, and the relevant handouts and numbers
on desks Inside, but the server computer and the N z-leaf must be set up Outside. We
need to have access to a printer Outside.
Set number of subjects in Background and Global. Sort clients and pre-ﬁll envelopes
with receipts and money and build three stacks.
Timing
1. Participants meet Outside
2. Give short description of what will happen [Brieﬁng]
3. Ask for a volunteer. If there are more, select them by drawing balls from the Urn.
Brief the volunteer
4. Participants draw a number from the box and are advised not to let us see it but to
look at the number Inside the lab facility, and report to the desk with that number
on it and follow the instructions. [Instructions performance]
26Note to editor and reviewers: this entire appendix, or some part of it, might be more suitable to put
online, for space considerations. To emphasize this, we write Not for publication in each part of the
appendix, although, if space permits, it might be helpful to have some parts of this in the publication.
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5. [PERFORMANCE TREATMENTS ONLY] Start the WORK Stage
6. [CASH TREATMENT ONLY] Experimenter screen Prompts Subject number and pay-
ment. Look up subject number and computer number in subject table and put post it
notes with subject number on the prepared envelopes [ENVELOPE]
(a) Take pre-ﬁlled envelopes and put in: If subject shock=1: 3 donation envelopes If
subject shock=0: 2 donation envelopes (Brot and WWF) and put subject number
on post-it on the big brown envelope Prompt the volunteer to come out. Hand
over the box with envelopes and instruct the volunteer to distribute the envelopes
to the tables 10.[on screen] Instruct subjects to open the envelopes, count the
money and enter the amount
7. DONATION PHASE  Donation
8. [CASH TREATMENT ONLY] Screen that reports payments tells subjects to put the
amount they promised to donate into the appropriate plain white envelopes.
9. After Questionnaire
(a) [CASH TREATMENTS ONLY] Subjects are instructed to collect their belong-
ings and get up from their desks. They put the SPENDEN envelopes into the
SPENDEN box and the BELEG into the BELEG Box. Volunteer makes sure that
all are ready the subjects are to come Outside to meet us. Volunteer opens the
SPENDEN [Donations] box and adds the actual donations. Volunteer observes
that experimenter donated the correct amount of money (online, using credit
card) and signs to this eﬀect. We pay volunteer, and volunteer signs receipt of
this. Volunteer also signs Volunteer Witness Form saying that I witnessed that
experimenters made [AMOUNTS HERE]¿ payments to charities. This payment
equaled the total of the actual subject contributions.
(b) [ENTITLEMENT TREATMENTS ONLY] Subjects are instructed to collect their
belongings and get up from their desks. They the BELEG into the BELEG Box.
Volunteer makes sure that all are ready the subjects are to come Outside to
meet us. Experimenters add up the donations recorded by ztree and show them
to volunteer. Volunteer observes that experimenter donated the correct amount of
money (online, using credit card) and signs to this eﬀect. We pay volunteer, and
volunteer signs receipt of this. Volunteer also signs Volunteer Witness Form saying
that I witnessed that experimenters made [AMOUNTS HERE]¿ payments to
charities.
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Records and book-keeping
Receipt forms (and Volunteer Witness Form) and records of donations (email response from
charity, credit card record, letters from charity when they arrive) will be sent to the graduate
school administrator at the Economics Department, University of Essex, UK or the Univer-
sity of Jena for reimbursement. Subjects are told that they can contact the administrator
[name provided to the subjects] if they are still skeptical and want to verify the (total, per
session) donations made.
B Description of charities  Not for publication
Brot für die Welt (Bread for the World)
Brot für die Welt is a development organisation by the church founded in 1959 in Berlin. It
is supported by all the country's Protestant and independent churches. The management
of the organisation "Bread for the World" is located at the Diakonisches Werk der EKD
eV, which is the legal entity of action. The annual fund-raising starts on the ﬁrst Advent,
the beginning of the liturgical year. Every action is under a particular theme, which will
indicate speciﬁcally funded projects. Most development projects are assigned to various
program topics. In 2007 "Brot für die Welt" mainly promoted measures to ensure food
security and access to basic services such as education and health. Other supported areas
are peacekeeping and democracy promotion, and the ﬁght against HIV / AIDS. As of 2005,
they have received over 1.6 billion Euro in donations for aid projects in Africa, Asia, Latin
America and for several years in Eastern Europe. In 2006 Bread for the World received
donations amounting to 51.5 million euros.
WWF
The WWF, the World Wide Fund For Nature, is one of the largest international nature con-
servancy organisation worldwide. It was founded in Switzerland in 1961 as World Wildlife
Fund. . The WWF wants to halt the worldwide destruction of nature and create a future
where humanity lives in harmony with nature. The WWF stands up for: conserving eco-
logical diversity, the sustainable use of natural resources, and the reduction of pollution and
harmful consumer behavior. Over the years the areas of expertise have grown from pure
species preservation: Now general topics of protecting the environemnt and climate change
are on the agenda of the WWF.
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Deutsches Rotes Kreuz (German Red Cross)
The German Red Cross is committed to life, health, welfare, protection, peaceful coexistence
and the dignity of all people. All people in need have the same entitlement to assistance,
without regard to nationality, race, religion, sex, social status or political conviction. The
DRC oﬀers help solely on the degree of need and the urgency of the assistance. The voluntary
assistance is used to restore the powers of self-help for people in need. The DRC will oﬀer all
services that are necessary to fulﬁll our mandate. They should meet the highest standards
and quality requirements. In fulﬁllment of our own objectives , the DRC cooperates with all
institutions and organizations in state and society that can be helpful and / or have similar
objectives. However, we are preserving our independence. We respond to competition from
others by improving the quality of our assistance, but also its economic viability.
C Screenshots of experimental stages  Not for publica-
tion
Figure 2: The real eﬀort task
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Figure 3: Promised Payments
You obtain 10.00¿ for this experiment. Please press OK.
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Figure 4: Cash Payments
You obtain 10.00¿ for this experiment.
The volunteer will now go to the outer part of the lab to get the envelopes and distribute
them. Please remain seated in the meanwhile and do not talk to your neighbors.
As soon as you receive the money, please count it.
Press OK after you have counted the money and signed the receipt.
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Figure 5: Donation Stage
Your earnings: ¿10.00
[Donation Decisions]
Your donation will be transferred under the supervision of the volunteer to
the respective organizations.
D Robustness checks  Not for publication
Table 4 presents the results of the regression on the proportion of income donated, us-
ing Papke-Wooldridge estimator for fractional response variables. The coeﬃcient on cash
payments is still signiﬁcant and negative, while the coeﬃcient on performance pay loses
signiﬁcance when adding additional controls, but the coeﬃcient itself does not change.
In table 5 we run the regressions from 3 split by charity. We ﬁnd a similar pattern for the
cash treatments over all charities, although the coeﬃcients on cash are are only signiﬁcantly
negative for WWF and DRK.
21
Table 4: Ratio of income donated (Papke-Wooldridge estimator)
(1) (2) (3)
Base Exp. Controls Add. controls
Share of earnings donated (total)
Pay cash -0.81** -0.75** -0.81**
(0.33) (0.33) (0.32)
Pay by performance -0.57* -0.50 -0.54
(0.34) (0.35) (0.36)
Cash × performance 0.36 0.26 0.37
(0.50) (0.51) (0.52)
Third charity 0.25 0.24
(0.24) (0.24)
Stake: 7.5 -0.67** -0.62**
(0.30) (0.30)
Stake: 10 -0.79*** -0.81***
(0.30) (0.29)
Female 0.57**
(0.26)
Constant -0.98*** -0.74*** -1.05***
(0.21) (0.26) (0.29)
Combined Coeﬃcients
Cash+perform+cash × perform -1.02 -0.98 -0.98
( 0.34) ( 0.33) ( 0.33)
Observations 190 190 190
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 5: Poisson regressions by charity
(1) (2) (3)
Brot f.d. Welt WWF DRK
main
Pay cash -0.44 -0.72** -1.39*
(0.27) (0.28) (0.59)
Pay by performance -0.41 -0.24 -0.76
(0.28) (0.24) (0.52)
Cash × performance 0.22 0.036 1.74*
(0.44) (0.43) (0.83)
Third charity -0.11 -0.049
(0.21) (0.19)
Stake: 7.5 -0.19 0.11 -0.63
(0.26) (0.23) (0.55)
Stake: 10 0.088 -0.11 0.38
(0.24) (0.25) (0.39)
Female 0.73** 0.12 0.62
(0.23) (0.20) (0.41)
Constant -0.77** -0.24 -0.99*
(0.27) (0.23) (0.50)
Combined Coeﬃcients
Cash+perform+cash × perform -0.62 -0.93 -0.41
( 0.30) ( 0.30) ( 0.45)
Observations 190 190 94
R2
Pseudo R2 0.050 0.039 0.105
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Marginal eﬀects reported. Constant dropped.
Session and time of day eﬀects
As the table below illustrates, our treatments are also not perfectly balanced over time:
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Table 6: Schedule of sessions and treatments
Date (m/d/yr) Time Subjects in treatments
Account/Random Cash/Random Account/Performance Cash/Performance
10/27/08 9:50 10
11:49 10
10/28/08 9:51 10
11:43 9
02/25/09 9:30 18
11:56 15
02/26/09 11:25 18
03/02/09 10:42 18
12:08 10
10/30/09 10:11 18
11:33 18
13:07 18
14:38 18
To test for session-speciﬁc eﬀects, we report regressions below standard errors clustered
by session, and controls for time-of-day and time-of-year eﬀects; our results are robust to all
of these. We divide our session times into three categories: 9.30-10:30 am, 10:31-12 noon, and
afternoon (12:01-14:38pm). The regressions below control for all of these time dummies,
and they are not jointly signiﬁcant. We also divide our sessions into four sets: those run in
October of 2008, those run in February and March of 2009, and those run in October 2009.
Again, these dummies are not jointly signiﬁcant in any of the regressions below.
Selection on performance diﬀerences
It is conceivable that those who do better on the task earn more, and these people might
be less generous on average. This selection might cause us to falsely attribute this to
a desert eﬀect  when we compare the high earners to those with high randomly-assigned
endowments, the former would tend to give less. As evidence against this, we ﬁnd the same
eﬀect across all stake sizes (results available by request). As payments when players get a
tie score are randomly assigned, we can also control for the absolute level of performance
(regression tables available by request). Adding a control for the number of correctly solved
sums to the regressions in table 3 barely alters any of coeﬃcients, and the coeﬃcient on this
control variable is tiny, insigniﬁcant, and tightly bounded around zero (e.g., if we add this
variable to the ﬁrst column of table 3 its coeﬃcient has a 95% conﬁdence interval of -0.08,
0.05).
This result supports Cherry et al. (2005), who write the selection of high and low en-
dowment dictators in the earned and windfall treatments diﬀer (exam score versus random),
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Table 7: Poisson and OLS regression on total donations
Gender contr.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Psn. OLS Psn. OLS
Pay cash -0.69** -.78** -0.70** -0.82**
(0.16) (0.18) (0.15) (0.18)
Pay by performance -0.42 -0.54 -0.43+ -0.59+
(0.26) (0.31) (0.22) (0.29)
Cash × performance 0.26 0.38 0.33 0.48
(0.34) (0.29) (0.33) (0.29)
Third charity 0.23 0.26
(0.22) (0.25)
Stake: 7.5 -0.06 -0.05
(0.31) (0.34)
Stake: 10 0.10 0.14
(0.27) (0.29)
Female 0.51* 0.55+
(0.24) (0.27)
Time dummies <Chi-sq>/[F-test] <0.23> [0.12] <0.54> [0.26]
{P-value of test} {0.89} {0.89} {0.76} {0.77}
Set dummies <Chi-sq>/[F-test] <0.85> [0.48] <1.41> [0.59]
{P-value of test} {0.65} {0.63} {0.50} {0.57}
Observations 190 190 190 190
R2 0.048 0.079
Pseudo R2 0.034 0.057
Standard errors in parentheses, reported clustered by session for OLS.
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 for tests using standard errors clustered by session for all columns.
All regressors are dichotomous (0,1) variables, dy/dx for discrete change of dummy variable reported .
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which may raise questions of sample selection, but previous research using this selection
method has found this is not a signiﬁcant concern.
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